INTRODUCTION
The Queensland Government has recently announced plans to drastically alter the legal framework for the regulation of lawyers in Queensland.
1 These proposed changes are largely in response to complaints about 'Caesar judging Caesar' which arose from a series of stories in the Brisbane Courier Mail.
2 Whilst much of this media attention focused on the Queensland Law Society's initial handling of complaints, very little study has been done of how well 'Caesar' judged those matters which did reach a formal disciplinary hearing. This article attempts to inform that debate, by looking closely at cases in which a lawyer has been suspended, rather than struck off or fined.
Disciplinary suspensions are worthy of study for two reasons. Firstly, the imposition of a suspension may not adequately protect the public. Secondly, even if it is argued that the real purpose of lawyer discipline is to legitimate the privileged position of lawyers, then suspension orders are not an effective vehicle for such a purpose. Suspensions send ambiguous messages to the public. One may expect that, whilst a legal profession seeking legitimacy may downplay the general level of misconduct within its ranks, some infrequent but harsh 'show trials' may be used to enhance the legitimation exercise by permanently casting miscreants out of the profession.
But when a practitioner is not struck off but merely suspended from practice for a certain period, she remains part of the profession, with the attendant risk that her presence, 'waiting in the wings' of the profession, will continue to taint the image of that profession. While professional discipline is designed to protect the public and whilst the conduct of this practitioner has been found to be serious enough to question her fitness to practise, the public in this case has not been protected at all costs. Instead, a compromise has been struck. The individual practitioner will be given an opportunity to redeem herself. Inevitably this will be seen by the public as exposing them to some risk, certainly more risk than had the practitioner been simply struck from the roll.
Taylor J was more confident in his view that, despite the fact that Ziems was in fact fit to practise, he should not be able to hold himself out as permitted to practise while serving a prison sentence for such a serious offence as manslaughter.
12 Instead Taylor J thought that he should be suspended for the period of his imprisonment. The court went on to make such an order.
It can therefore be seen that, despite the fact that both Fullagar and Kitto JJ agreed to an order suspending Ziems from practice for the period of his imprisonment, both indicated that suspension is normally only justified if a practitioner is unfit to practise. In contrast, those in the minority, Dixon CJ and McTiernan J, thought it much more desireable to strike off a practitioner shown to b e unfit to practise rather than merely suspend him. The practitioner could reapply for admission when he could lead positive evidence to show that he was once again fit to practise. The necessary implication of these comments in Ziems is that the High Court of Australia saw very little room for the operation of suspension orders. If a person remains fit to practise his right to practise should not be impugned, by either a suspension order or a strike off order and, once shown to be unfit to practise, a strike off is usually the most appropriate order. The decision in Ziems greatly narrows the circumstances in which suspensions are justified. If not fit to practise, the practitioner should normally be struck off. If fit to practise, he should be allowed to remain in practice.
In New South Wales Bar Association v Evatt, 13 the High Court narrowed the role of suspensions even further, overturning the two year suspension of a barrister who had engaged in a scheme of charging 'extortionate and grossly excessive fees'.
14 The High Court ordered that he be disbarred, notwithstanding his youth and his lack of 9 Ibid 290, 297. A similar argument based on 'incongruity' in relation to a practitioner was upheld in Re B [1986] VR 695, 705-6 (Brooking J). understanding, stating that his 'failure to understand the error of his ways of itself demonstrates his unfitness '. 15 Apart from the restricted approach to suspension orders afforded by the High Court in Ziems and Evatt, case law in Queensland also suggests that suspensions are not appropriate where there is evidence of dishonest conduct by a practitioner.
In cases during the 1930s, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland did allow a number of suspensions to stand, despite the fact that there was evidence of dishonesty. 16 These appeals were brought by the practitioner alleging that the penalty imposed, a suspension, was excessive. It would seem that in t he 1930s, fines were routinely ordered, even in cases of misappropriation from the trust account. 17 At this time, the Attorney-General had no power of appeal and the Law Society, whilst having the power to appeal, 18 did not exercise this power until 1983. But once the AttorneyGeneral was given the power in 1938 to appeal decisions of the Statutory Committee, 19 an appeal by the Attorney-General saw a three year suspension for misappropriation overturned and the solicitor struck off.
20 Macrossan SPJ, with whom RJ Douglas J and Philp J agreed, stated that, unless exceptional circumstances appeared, a solicitor who has stolen monies from his client should be struck off. 21 During the subsequent 40 year period, , no appeals were heard in relation to the adequacy of the sanction imposed. 22 The court did not have another opportunity to comment upon its attitude to suspensions until Mellifont v The Queensland Law Society Inc 23 in 1980.
Mellifont had appealed against a tribunal order suspending him for five years. 24 He argued that such an order was too harsh in the circumstances. The tribunal had found that Mellifont had acted fraudulently in seeking to hide errors in the trust account. He had made false trust account entries, fabricated a letter to explain a payment from the In re G (a solicitor) [1940] QWN 7. 21 Ibid 10. In another appeal by the Attorney-General, arguing that a two year suspension was too lenient and heard six months later, the court dismissed the appeal, confirming that stealing required proof of more than wrongful conversion. In the circumstances, the two year suspension was adequate: Re NEG (1940) QWN 25.
22
The number of appeals during this period were few and related to the procedural powers of the tribunal: Re a Solicitor [1953] in which Reynolds JA had said that the disciplinary tribunal must not impose a suspension unless confident that, at the end of the suspension, the practitioner would be fit to practise. 26 It would be unlikely that the tribunal could often be confident of this if the practitioner before it was presently unfit. 27 The tribunal would need to be sure that a transformation of character would occur before the suspension ended.
28
Andrews J went on to say that, given the deceit, dishonesty and dishonour of Mellifont's conduct, a fine was not appropriate 29 and nor was a suspension, given that the court could not be satisfied that Mellifont would be again fit to practise at the end of any period of suspension. The court ordered that he be struck from the roll.
About six years after Mellifont, the Supreme Court had another opportunity to indicate its attitude to suspension orders. The tribunal had imposed a 12 month suspension upon a practitioner found to have lied under oath and g iven misleading information to the Law Society.
30 Upon appeal by the Queensland Law Society, 31 the suspension was overturned and the practitioner struck from the roll.
32
The court again queried the legitimacy of a suspension order where dishonesty was involved. Ibid, cited by Andrews J in Mellifont at 31.
28
The difficulties of assessing fitness to practise at the end of a period of suspension had been foreshadowed in Re M, A Solicitor [1938] St R Qd 454 where Graham AJ said (at 463):
'During the hearing of the appeal I considered the advisableness, in the interests both of the public and the offender, of suggesting a change in the form of the punishment so as to make the possibility of the appellant's return to actual practice conditional upon proof of penitence and good behaviour during the term of suspension.' However, his Honour finally agreed to the usual, unconditional, return to practice at the end of the three year period of suspension ordered in that case.
29
Mellifont had been before the tribunal on three prior occasions for failing to respond to Law Society investigations. On each occasion he had been fined: SC 175, 6 July 1970 ($150); SC 191, 27 April 1973 ($100); SC 207, 29 October 1975 ($600 In Attorney-General v Brown 34 the practitioner had been found guilty of professional misconduct due to his knowing participation in the backdating of documents and the preparation and filing of false affidavits to assist his clients. In deciding to suspend Brown for 21 months, the tribunal had made reference to his '28 years of unblemished practice and the strong testimonials produced on his behalf'. 35 It was common ground in an appeal by the Attorney-General that these were not valid mitigating factors in disciplinary proceedings as they did not address the issue of the practitioner's fitness to practise. The practitioner therefore sought to argue that the tribunal had taken account of a number of other, valid, mitigating factors in determining the appropriate penalty.
36
The Court of Appeal thought that it was 'impossible to conclude that a period of suspension affords adequate protection to the public' 37 given the respondent's deliberate and sustained course of grave misconduct designed to mislead the court, and his lack of remorse. The decision of the Statutory Committee was set aside and the practitioner struck off.
About four years after the appeal in Brown, the Queensland Law Society appealed another tribunal decision in Queensland Law Society v Mead. 38 On 18 September 1996 the tribunal had suspended Mead for 33 months despite the fact that the practitioner had been before the tribunal only 18 months earlier and fined $10 000. 39 Ten days after that earlier tribunal hearing the respondent again transferred trust monies to his general account without authority. There had been no restitution or indication of remorse and the Court of Appeal had no hesitation in concluding that the practitioner was no longer a fit and proper person to practise and ordered that he be struck from the roll. 40 In the course of the judgment the court said:
Reliance was placed upon the circumstance that the respondent had practised as a solicitor in his own business or firm for a substantial period as a factor which indicated that his fitness to practice [sic] would be re-established after the period of suspension imposed, which it was argued was consistent with a sound exercise of discretion by the Statutory Committee.
The conduct particularised establishes that in the months following his first being dealt with by the Statutory Committee the respondent acted in blatant disregard of the standards of professional behaviour expected of him. In the light of that there is no proper basis for concluding that the respondent would be fit to resume practice or apply for a 43 This matter did not go to a full court hearing as the practitioner consented to an order that he be struck from the roll. However the Attorney-General had argued in pleadings that such open-ended suspensions were inappropriate, as an improper delegation of the tribunal's responsibilities to the Law Society.
44
In Attorney-General v Bax 45 the tribunal had ordered the practitioner to pay a fine of $15 000. 46 On appeal, the Attorney-General argued that the practitioner should be struck from the roll and in its simultaneous appeal, the Queensland Law Society argued that the practitioner should be suspended. The facts in Bax were quite similar to those in Brown:
47 the practitioner had backdated documents to seek an advantage for his client by removing property from the reach of creditors should the client become bankrupt. Also, as in Brown, Bax had continued this deception by evasive comments in the Federal Court, during Law Society investigations and before the tribunal. One redeeming feature to distinguish the case from Brown was that Bax had not filed any false affidavits in court. However, Pincus JA thought that the substantial nature of the deception over a period of time required that Bax be removed from the roll as it showed that he was not fit to practise. His Honour then considered, as a secondary matter, whether the removal should be permanent or temporary, by way of a period of suspension, but his Honour did not consider an order for suspension to be appropriate given the practitioner's lack of remorse. This would suggest that the practitioner was not fit to continue in practice.
48 Shepherdson J and McPherson JA also placed great weight on the practitioner's lack of remorse and agreed that the appropriate order was one striking the practitioner from the roll.
49
The court also thought it preferable to strike a practitioner from the roll and allow him to apply for readmission at a later time in Attorney-General v Gregory. 50 Gregory had been convicted of contempt of court and fined $4000 in the District Court for The Attorney-General argued that it was an improper delegation because the subsequent fitness to resume practise is left at the discretion of the Law Society. Had the practitioner been struck off, his subsequent fitness to practise would have been a question for the Supreme Court in an application for readmission. See later discussion of open-ended suspensions in text. attempting to influence a witness to change h er evidence to make it more favourable to his client. The disciplinary tribunal had suspended him for two years.
51 Upon appeal by the Attorney-General, the court acknowledged that the misconduct comprised an isolated, unpremeditated incident for which Gregory had shown remorse. But de Jersey CJ felt that … such misconduct will inevitably establish unfitness to practice [sic] . That is because it demonstrates the absence of critically important qualities. In the absence of some quite exceptional circumstance -which I am presently at a loss to imagine -such conduct should lead to the striking off of the offender. The appropriate course is that he should then be left, before reapplying for admission -if he wishes to take that course -so to conduct himself as to demonstrate redevelopment of the qualities he must for the present be taken to lack.
52
Similarly, White J thought that the appropriate course was to strike Gregory from the roll, allowing him to apply for readmission at a later time when he could prove his fitness to practise.
53
Another suspension order was overturned by the Court of Appeal in Queensland Law Society v Carberry. 54 On 6 March 2000 the tribunal had found Carberry guilty of professional misconduct and suspended him from practice for 12 months. 55 Both the Attorney-General and Law Society appealed.
56
Both argued that Carberry should be struck off. The most serious charge against the practitioner related to a potential conflict of interest which the tribunal thought 'inadvertently or accidentally advanced an associate of the practitioner to the disadvantage of his client.' 57 However, Moynihan SJA and Atkinson J in the Court of Appeal felt that the practitioner was aware of the conflict of interest. 58 Pincus JA thought that it was 'no accident' that the practitioner had preferred the interests of his business associate to those of his client. 59 In the words of Moynihan SJA and Atkinson J:
The more he sought to extricate himself by advancing an 'innocent' explanation or justification, the more he entangled himself in a failure to appreciate elementary but critically important obligations of a solicitor to a client.
60
The findings against the practitioner demonstrated his 'unfitness to practice [sic] ' 61 and a suspension could then only apply in exceptional circumstances, given that the court 51 Re Gregory (1998) (Unreported, NSWCA, 233 of 1982 , 20 September 1982 .
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'Waiting in the Wings': The Suspension of Queensland Lawyers must be satisfied that the practitioner will be again fit to practise at the end of the period of suspension. 62 The conduct of the practitioner and his explanations did not suggest that he would be fit to practise at the end of any period of suspension, 'and it is not in the public interest that he should be permitted to [practise] '. 63 Pincus JA agreed that the misconduct was 'bad enough to force one to the unpleasant conclusion that mere suspension is insufficient '. 64 In summary, two decisions of the High Court of Australia and nine decisions of the Queensland Court of Appeal have narrowed the circumstances in which a suspension is an appropriate order to make.
B Long Suspensions
The longer the period of suspension imposed, the closer the order equates to an order striking a practitioner from the roll and the more likely that the imposition of such an order by the tribunal will invite an appeal by the Attorney-General or Law Society.
While the legislation is silent as to the range of suspension that the tribunal can order, the tribunal in Queensland has usually imposed suspensions of between three months and three years. 65 It has only imposed suspensions of longer than three years on three occasions: although the tribunal i mposed five year suspensions in 1933 66 and 1948, 67 neither of these decisions was appealed. As mentioned previously, it was in fact the practitioner, Mellifont, who appealed against his suspension, arguing that five years was too long. He may well have regretted lodging the appeal as by the time that the Law Society respondent had argued its case for a strike off order, counsel for Mellifont was simply arguing that the Full Court should impose an order 'similar to the one appealed from': [1981] Qd R 17, 30. 70 Re Mellifont (1980) 10 QLSJ 125; (1981 ) 11 QLSJ 47, SC 230, 20 March 1980 [1981] Qd R 17, 28. (2003) All members of the court agreed that the appropriate order was that the practitioner be struck from the roll.
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C Possible Exceptions
While generally speaking, the court has shown a propensity to disallow suspension orders upon appeal, this has not always been the case. In Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc 73 the solicitor had shared receipts with an unqualified person and had lied to the Law Society about his arrangements with the person. Given the number of cases in which the court has indicated the limited role of suspension orders, it is perhaps surprising that the Court overturned the tribunal order striking Adamson from the roll and replaced it with an order that he be suspended from practice for 12 months. However, there are indications in the judgment that the court m ay have considered the Law Society's pursuit of Adamson to be over-zealous. The court appeared to be unimpressed with many aspects of the Law Society investigation and the proceedings before the tribunal, as illustrated by the court's order that the practitioner pay only onethird of the Society's costs before the tribunal.
74 Thomas J, with whom Connolly and Ambrose JJ agreed, justified the suspension on the basis that there was no evidence of client dissatisfaction and there was no evidence of failure to supervise the work of the person with whom the practitioner was sharing receipts. 75 In addition, the solicitor had successfully defended four of the six charges against him. What is unusual in Adamson, given the trend in the cases, is the court's willingness to excuse his lie to the Law Society investigator. One is left with a sense that the court wished to show its displeasure with the Society for pursuing such a matter so doggedly in the first place.
76
The Supreme Court also allowed a three year suspension to stand in Re Wheeler 77 despite some evidence of conflict of interest, breach of trust and knowingly making false assertions in two letters to fellow solicitors. Despite the apparent dishonesty by the practitioner, the decision of the court to allow the suspension to stand in this case can perhaps be at least partly explained by the delay before the case came to court. The suspension had been imposed by the tribunal on 12 March 1987 78 and by the time of the Full Court's decision four years later, 79 Dowsett J 80 commented that 'it would seem that the appellant has already served his period of suspension and no point will be served by "fine-tuning" at this stage.' Ibid 31 (Andrews J); 28 (DM Campbell J). Connolly J only appears to have sat on the appeal against finding, not on the later hearing as to penalty and costs. 73 [1990] 1 Qd R 498.
74
In the vast majority of cases, the practitioner is ordered to pay all of the Law Society's costs of the tribunal proceedings. 75 [1990] 1 Qd R 498, 508.
76
Ibid 501-3 (Thomas J).
77
[1992] 2 Qd R 690. With whom Macrossan CJ and Ryan J agreed.
81
[1992] 2 Qd R 690, 703. Also of apparent significance was the fact that the Law Society had abandoned its appeal and that, in its deliberations, the tribunal had incorrectly imposed the obligations of a director upon Wheeler as a solicitor. Given that only the practitioner's cross- In both Adamson 82 and Wheeler, 83 the court did not impose harsher sentences than those imposed by the tribunal, even though there was some evidence that the practitioner had been dishonest. But these were cases where it was the practitioner who had appealed. As the 1990s progressed, the Attorney-General appealed more decisions, as did the Law Society. By the mid to late 1990s, where the tribunal imposed a suspension, it became more common for either the Law Society or the Attorney-General to lodge an appeal. There was also an increased likelihood that those appeals would be successful. On the hearing of t hese appeals, the Court generally took a harsher approach, overturning a number of suspensions and substituting an order that the practitioner be struck from the roll. However, Clough v Queensland Law Society Inc 84 provides an exception to that general trend.
In Clough 85 the tribunal had ordered that the practitioner be suspended for 12 months.
86
The practitioner appealed against both findings and order, and the Law Society crossappealed against the order and argued that the practitioner should be struck off. The Attorney-General also appealed against the suspension order and sought a strike off order. 87 Although Pincus JA thought the tribunal's findings had been 'the most charitable which could be adopted', 88 the case proceeded on the basis that the practitioner's conduct amounted to incompetence rather than a dishonest attempt to further his client's case. Whilst stating that even the incompetent could be struck from the roll, 89 the court allowed the 12 month suspension to stand given that:
• appealed against a 12 month suspension imposed by the disciplinary tribunal. 94 The tribunal had found the practitioner guilty of unprofessional conduct for failing to keep proper records of trust monies as required by the Trust Accounts Act 1973 (Qld) and of failing to provide accounts of the trust assets to the client or the Law Society when requested. The tribunal gave no reasons why it was imposing a suspension but the Court of Appeal referred to a number of personal circumstances which 'helped provide some explanation for the respondent's grossly unsatisfactory conduct' 95 and noted that there was no evidence of dishonesty or deceit in an isolated lapse 96 and that excellent character references had been tendered. 97 The Court of Appeal dismissed the AttorneyGeneral's appeal, determining that there was no evidence that the suspension order was manifestly inadequate.
98
Regardless of whether or not the decisions in Clough and Priddle suggest that the appellate court is now interfering less often in the tribunal's use of suspensions, the general trend of the case law since Ziems 99 in 1957 has been to restrict the circumstances in which the court accepts that a suspension order will adequately protect the public. The aim of this article is to determine the degree to w hich the tribunal imposed suspensions at a time when the appellate court was discouraging such orders. Therefore, any very recent change in the attitude of the appellate court is of less relevance to that question. This article will now consider the practice of the disciplinary tribunal in the use of suspensions.
III CONTINUING USE OF SUSPENSIONS BY TRIBUNAL
As discussed in more detail above, on the 24 th October 1980, in Mellifont v Queensland Law Society Inc 100 the Supreme Court of Queensland limited the circumstances in which suspensions were appropriate, using the most unambiguous language in its ruling. Subsequent cases have generally confirmed the limited role of suspensions. It could therefore be expected that fewer practitioners would be suspended by the disciplinary tribunal after Mellifont, and that, even when a suspension was imposed, it would be for a shorter duration. That does not appear to be the case.
A Statistical Evidence
An analysis of disciplinary outcomes reveals that neither the rate of suspensions nor their duration decreased after Mellifont. As part of a larger study into disciplinary Given that the disciplinary tribunal often fails to give reasons 107 for its decision, it is often difficult to know why a suspension was imposed in any particular case. However, it is tentatively suggested that suspensions may sometimes be imposed when the tribunal sympathises with the solicitor before it. It is noted that after Mellifont, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, solicitors in Queensland were suffering difficult times: the world sharemarket crashed in October 1987, in November 1989 the High Court held that Queensland practitioners could no longer be protected from competition by interstate practitioners. 108 The gross fees of practitioners dropped markedly in the period [1990] [1991] 109 as Australia entered an economic recession and fees did not begin to improve again until 1995. 110 The conveyancing scale was abolished in Queensland in 1993, which may have also led to a downturn in income. It may therefore be the case that, despite statements by the court as to the proper role of suspensions as well as statements that personal mitigating factors should have little bearing in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, 111 the tribunal upon occasions may have felt some sympathy for the economic plight of a practitioner and suspended him rather than struck him from the roll. If so, this may suggest that elements of a retributive approach are present in the disciplinary system, as has already been noted in relation to the use of fines by the tribunal.
112
Some specific cases in which suspensions have been ordered will now be considered in an attempt to determine whether the disciplinary tribunal has imposed suspensions in accordance with the existing case law.
B Specific Cases
Given that the tribunal must be satisfied that, at the end of any period of suspension, the practitioner will be fit to practise again, any dishonest conduct would suggest that a suspension is inappropriate, even if the misconduct is isolated and unpremeditated. The period ended on 24 October 1980, being the date of the judgment in Mellifont.
105
As this percentage has been calculated from the entire population of disciplinary cases, rather than from a sample, it is irrelevant whether the higher percentage is statistically significant or not.
106
Given that the extremely long (60 month) suspension imposed by the tribunal in Mellifont is included in and therefore skews the results for the pre-Mellifont group, the median is used in preference to the mean. 109 From $837 655 in 1990 to $759 384 in 1991 : G Meredith, Queensland Legal Professional Cost Index 1997 -1998 and 1998 -1999 A suspension was imposed in Re Crowley 114 despite a finding of fraud. The practitioner was found guilty of fraudulently converting $19 900 and of making a false representation to a Law Society auditor in relation to monies held in trust. 115 The tribunal suspended t he practitioner for six months and fined him $5000 upon the practitioner undertaking that he would not apply for a principal's practising certificate for three years. The tribunal noted that it had taken into account that, although the practitioner was guilty of fraudulent conversion, this fraud was to the use of 'Company X' and there was 'no immediate financial gain accruing to the practitioner'. 116 The tribunal also noted that it had taken into account the practitioner's youth, the character references provided, and the pressures to which the practitioner subjected himself in running a solo practice.
117 But equally, a finding of fraud would suggest a suspension was not appropriate given the preceding case law. Nor were youth or the pressures of practice valid mitigating factors when issues of honesty were involved.
118
Since Mellifont, suspensions have been imposed in other cases involving apparently dishonest conduct, including three cases of forgery or of preparing false documents.
119
An inappropriate use of suspensions is also suggested by three disciplinary decisions, all involving the same practitioner.
120 On his first appearance, the practitioner was found to have acted in a dishonest way on a number of occasions: by preparing and sending a false bill of costs to the Legal Services Commission of NSW on the 16 January 1985 to mislead the Commission into believing that he had charged the client $3750 when in fact he had charged the client $13 750, by preparing a false mortgage document to mislead Defence Service Home Corporation into believing that his client had received bridging finance, and by making a false statement to that Corporation on 28 August 1985.
121 Thus, not only do these acts appear dishonest, they also do not appear to be isolated, given the dates involved. Without giving any reasons for such an order, the practitioner was suspended for 19 months.
122 That suspension expired on 30 June 1989.
114
(1996) 1 Disciplinary Action Reports 6, SC 383, 10 December 1996.
115
Ibid. In addition, he was found to have transferred $20 000 from his trust account to his general account without authority. He also pleaded guilty to borrowing $25 000 from a client in breach of He was also found guilty of transferring monies from the trust account into his general account without authority on a number of occasions.
122
Re Willcox (1988 ) 18 QLSJ 411, SC 298, 1 December 1987 , 417. HALLER (2003 Six months later, on 5 December 1989, the practitioner was again before the tribunal upon a charge that on 15 July 1989 he had advertised his business, Property Transfer Co, in two Brisbane newspapers, in breach of strict ethical rules at the time. 123 By majority, the charge was found proved and the practitioner, who had just emerged from a 19 month suspension, was again suspended, again for a period of 19 months, until 30 June 1991.
124 Whilst questions could be raised as to whether the practitioner was fit to practise at the time of his first appearance before the tribunal, when he was found guilty of dishonest conduct, it is more debatable whether the public needed to be protected from his unauthorised advertising. Nevertheless, the simple fact that the practitioner had been before the tribunal on an earlier occasion would raise serious questions as to his fitness to practise on a subsequent occasion and therefore, whether a second suspension was the most appropriate order to make. The practitioner appeared before the tribunal again on 6 December 1990 when he was struck off for practising as a solicitor whilst under suspension. 125 Other practitioners have been suspended on subsequent occasions. In Re Tunn, 126 the practitioner was suspended for 14 months in 1992 after being found guilty of five breaches of Rule 83 of the Queensland Law Society Rules 1987 (Qld) 127 and four charges of touting for business in breach of Rule 81(1), 128 two charges of failing to register transfer documents, as well as charges of failing to deposit monies with the Society, failing to reconcile the trust account and failing to follow various advice from the Law Society.
129 This practitioner had already appeared before the tribunal on 28 October 1985 130 when he had been fined $3000 after he was found to have wrongfully converted $2637.19 of trust monies to pay rent, failed to keep proper trust accounting records, failed to advise a client that the client's appeal had been listed and that the practitioner intended to seek leave to withdraw, and failed to advise the client that the appeal was likely to be dismissed if the client was not legally represented. As in Re Willcox, this earlier appearance may have suggested that a suspension was not an appropriate response on his second appearance in 1992. But the practitioner was to appear before the tribunal on a third occasion, in 1994, when he was again suspended, this time for a period of 12 months. 131 On his third appearance, the practitioner admitted to failing to reveal to his clients, the purchasers of certain land, that he was a director and shareholder of the vendor company. He also admitted two charges of acting without instructions, practising without a practising certificate and also admitted to a criminal conviction.
132 Given the nature of the charges on his third appearance, and the two earlier findings of professional misconduct, it is surprising that the tribunal was satisfied 123 Re Willcox (Unreported, SC 318, 5 December 1989). Rule 81(1), which prohibited the unfair attraction of business, was removed in 1995.
124
It is worth noting that on both occasions the practitioner was suspended until the beginning of a financial year. It is unlikely that the tribunal could be confident that this was the time at which the practitioner would again be fit to practise.
125
Re Willcox (Unreported, SC 321, 6 December 1990).
126
(1993) 13 QLSJ 190, SC 340, 4 November 1992. 127 Failing to respond to Queensland Law Society, now contained in s 5G of the Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld). Re a Practitioner (1985) 15 QLSJ 407, SC 279, 28 October 1985. 131 Re Tunn (1995 ) 25 QLSJ 208, SC 354, 28 September 1994 Ibid. The conviction related to two counts of sodomy. Delaney (1993 ) 23 QLSJ 190, SC 344, 15 February 1993 suspended for 28 months after failing to pay a professional indemnity insurance premium, acting as a solicitor without a practising certificate and failing to pay $500 into his trust account. He had previously appeared before the tribunal in 1985 and fined $1000 for preferring the interests of one client over the interests of another by failing to lodge a mortgage or caveat to secure a loan and, in relation to another loan, also preferred the interests of one client over the interests of another by failing to advise the client lender that the loan was to be used to pay outstanding indebtedness of the borrower client or otherwise protect the interests of the lender: Re X (1985) 15 QLSJ 353; 7. Re Revell (1994 ) 24 QLSJ 380, SC 352, 22 February 1994 suspended for three years for numerous trust account breaches, misleading the Law Society and misleading the tribunal. He had been censured and ordered to arrange a management audit and attend LawCare in 1993 by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal after failing to respond to Law Society requests for information: Re X (1993) 23 Queensland Law Society Journal 295, SDT 40, 9 February 1993; 8. Re Tunn SC 354, 28 September 1994 (again) , discussed above in text at n 126; 9. Re Mead (1997) 1 Disciplinary Action Report 4, SC 378, 18 September 1996. Discussed in text at n 38. This suspension was set aside on appeal and the practitioner struck off : Queensland Law Society Inc v Mead [1997 ] QCA 83 (22 April 1997 10. Re Webster (1999) 4 Disciplinary Action Report 9, SCT 6, 3 July 1998: suspended for one year for failing to respond to Law Society requests for information and for failing to supply a bill of costs. He had previously been fined $10000 by the tribunal for borrowing from a client and for sending a misleading letter to the Law Society: Re X (1993) 23 QLSJ 90. This prior appearance is not referred to in the latter report; 11. Re Carberry (2000) 6 Disciplinary Action Report 17, SCT 31, 6 March 2000 (suspended for 12 months. He had previously appeared before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal in 1992 and was fined $400 for failing to respond to Law Society requests for information). This suspension was overturned on appeal. See discussion in text;
As recently as February 2003 the tribunal suspended a solicitor for nine months, after finding him guilty of misappropriating $630 by transferring it into his general office account when he knew that his fees were in dispute, of giving false information to the Law Society as to the type of work performed by an employee, 136 and of failing to provide documents as requested by the Law Society, in breach of s 5H. This suspension was imposed despite the fact that the tribunal felt that the solicitor 'gives the appearance of still not believing he has done anything wrong and is likely therefore to re-offend'.
137
The tribunal went on to say that it felt that he was 'capable of learning now from his mistakes'. 138 However, it would seem from the earlier comments that the tribunal could not be sure that the solicitor would gain the necessary insight into his conduct to be fit to resume practice when the nine month suspension expired.
C Open Ended Suspensions
On occasions, the difficulty of satisfying the Mellifont test 140 appears to have tempted the tribunal to suspend the practitioner for an indefinite period, leaving the decision of when the suspension is to end at the discretion of the Law Society. An example can be seen in Re Smith, 141 where the tribunal had ordered that the practitioner be suspended 'until such time as he is able to satisfy the Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc that he is a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate.' 142 Had the practitioner been struck off, his subsequent fitness to practise would have been a question for the Supreme Court in an application for readmission. 
136
The tribunal found that the employee was practising as a solicitor without a practising certificate. The practitioner had claimed that the employee was working as a law clerk.
137
Re Whitman (Unreported, SCT 83, 12 February 2003, 7) . 138 Ibid.
139
The courts place a heavy emphasis in disciplinary matters on the need for insight into past misconduct, as discussed in Reid Mortensen, 'Lawyers' Character, Moral Insight and Ethical Blindness ' (2002) 22 The Queensland Lawyer 166. 140 That is, the need to be satisfied at the time of the tribunal hearing that the practitioner will be fit to practise at the end of the suspension period: By failing to nominate an exact date upon which the suspension will end, the tribunal could be said to imply that, at the time of the hearing, the tribunal was unable to determine when the practitioner would be fit to practise again, if at all. This arguably suggests that the practitioner should be struck off rather than suspended.
145 Open-ended suspensions are also open to attack on the basis that the suspension could in fact last for a long period of time, a practice which was criticised in Mellifont. In the 1800s, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland, in its inherent jurisdiction, made open-ended suspension orders by suspending practitioners until monies owing to the client were repaid. 148 This may suggest that the Supreme Court would not be hostile to such open-ended suspensions, when such a case finally comes before it on appeal. However, these cases in 1868 and 1878 predated the Queensland Law Society Act of 1927, and were therefore heard at a time when only the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over solicitors and only it had power to determine whether a suspended solicitor could resume practice. Nor was there any 'second line of defence' through a requirement that solicitors hold an annual practising certificate.
149 Presumably the solicitors in those cases were found to be fit to practise at the time of the disciplinary hearing, and the suspension was used as an effective device to ensure that client monies were repaid. This is also suggested by the fact that it was not until 50 years later, in Re M, A Solicitor 150 that the Supreme Court of Queensland identified the protective function of disciplinary proceedings. Thus, during the 1800s the Court's focus may have been on the need to compensate clients.
It should also be noted that, should a similar order be made by the tribunal today, it would not require any assessment of fitness to practise, merely the determination as to whether or not monies had been paid. Thus such on order even today, may not offend the ruling in Mellifont.
However, the article has provided evidence to show that the tribunal which disciplines solicitors has continued to impose suspensions at a higher rate than would be expected. The use of suspensions is not consistent with a legitimation theory because of the ambiguous message which it sends to the public. An examination of some cases in which suspensions h ave been imposed also raises questions as to whether a suspension was an appropriate order in the particular case.
One possible explanation for the high rate of suspension is that the tribunal has operated under a more retributive model than has been previously conceded. In other words, in cases in which the tribunal would otherwise strike a solicitor from the roll, the tribunal may have taken personal mitigating factors into account to spare the individual the greater shame of being struck off. The tribunal may hope that the solicitor will choose to retire from practice voluntarily following the suspension. In addition, given the high rate of sole practitioners who appear before the tribunal, 190 the tribunal may believe that the practical effect of the suspension order will be to remove the solicitor from practice, as it may be difficult for a sole practitioner to resurrect their practice after a period of suspension. Although it is unknown how many suspended solicitors do resume practice, if a number of them do voluntarily retire from practice, a suspension order may be of greater protective effect than it initially appears. This is particularly true when combined with the fact that the Law Society has extensive statutory powers to refuse practising certificates, even when a period of suspension has been completed.
In addition, the tribunal, as part of its suspension order, may refer back to the Law Society decisions about when a solicitor is ready to resume practice, as when the tribunal imposes an open-ended suspension. Therefore in practical terms, a decision as to whether an individual will or will not be allowed to practise becomes an administrative rather than a judicial decision and the tribunal plays a demonstrative rather than a practical role.
By comparison to the suspension of solicitors, this article has shown that barristers are rarely suspended. Whilst very few barristers face formal disciplinary proceedings, those who do are much more likely to be struck off. The obvious explanation would be that only the most serious disciplinary matters involving barristers are brought before the court, lessening the likelihood of a suspension order. In addition, it must be noted that it has been the solicitors' disciplinary tribunal which has imposed suspensions whilst the Supreme Court of Queensland has generally discouraged their use. The Bar Association of Queensland has no power to suspend a barrister from practice. Such an order can only be imposed by the Supreme Court, hence the low rate of suspensions i s consistent with the court's position in relation to the suspension of solicitors.
Another reason why the Supreme Court has not suspended barristers could be the absence of practising certificates for barristers, meaning that there is no 'second line of defence' as there is in relation to solicitors. Equally, the Supreme Court may be loath to extend the same 'mercy' to barristers as the solicitors' disciplinary tribunal appears to sometimes extend to solicitors. This article has sought to enlighten the debate on professional discipline by providing information about the actual use of suspensions by the solicitors' disciplinary tribunal. Such a close examination raises questions as to whether a suspension was the most appropriate order in particular cases. It is tentatively suggested that, given the practical impact of Law Society powers in relation to practising certificates, disciplinary proceedings involving solicitors may play a greater demonstrative role than is normally conceded. The use of suspensions in circumstances which suggest that a strike off order may have been a more appropriate order also suggests that an element of retribution may exist in the disciplinary system, despite protestations that the proceedings are to protect, not punish.
